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The causal relationship between short- and long-term interest 
rates: an empirical assessment of the United States  
 
Matteo Deleidi and Enrico Sergio Levrero1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper addresses one of the central aspects of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy, namely the ability of central banks to affect the structure of interest rates. To shed light 
on this issue, we assess the causal relationship between short- and long-term interest rates, that 
is, the Effective Federal Funds Rate (FF), the Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 
(AAA), and the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (GB10Y). We apply Structural Vector 
Autoregressive (SVAR) models to monthly data provided by the Federal Reserve Economic 
Data (FRED). Our findings – estimated for the 1954-2018 period – outline an asymmetry in 
the relationship between short- and long-term interest rates. In particular, although we found a 
bidirectional relationship when the 10-year treasury bond 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 was included as the long-run 
rate, a unidirectional relationship that moves from short- to long-term interest rates is estimated 
when the interest rate on corporate bonds ranked AAA is taken into consideration. Furthermore, 
the conclusions drawn by the impulse response functions (IRFs) are confirmed and 
strengthened by the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) which shows that 
monetary policy is able to permanently affect long-term interest rates over a long temporal 
horizon, i.e., not only in the short run but also in the long run. In this way, following the 
Keynesian tradition, long-term interest rates appear to be strongly influenced by the central 
bank. Finally, despite the fact that the Federal Fund rate (𝐹𝐹) is weakly affected by long-term 
interest rate shocks, the estimated FEVD shows that 𝐹𝐹 is mainly determined by its own shock 
allowing us to assume that the central bank has a certain degree of freedom in setting the levels 
of short-run interest rates. 
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1. Introduction 
Several issues are still open regarding the relationship between short- and long-term interest 
rates. One concerns the elements that shape the structure of interest rates – in particular, the 
weight and variability of liquidity and risk premiums. Another issue regards the ability of 
central banks to affect long-term interest rates and whether their action has only a temporary 
or also a permanent effect. Since in practice, central banks have mainly operated within the 
short-run segments of bond and credit markets – at least until the recent financial crisis of 2007 
– this issue is usually addressed by analysing the relationship between the short-term policy 
interest rate and the long-term interest rates on public and private bonds. This is crucial for the 
effectiveness of monetary policy because the components of aggregate demand – especially, 
private investments – are recognized to be sensitive mainly to long-term interest rates. It is also 
relevant when discussing whether monetary policy can affect income distribution. Only in the 
case of a permanent causal relationship going from the policy interest rate to bond rates – or 
more generally, only if central banks are able to control the structure of interest rates – an 
alternative theory of distribution can be advanced in which the decisions of monetary 
authorities on the interest rate regime have an effect on the rate of profits (cf. in this respect, 
Panico, 1987; Pivetti, 1991; Sraffa, 1960).  
The current paper aims to estimate precisely the causal relationship between short- and 
long-term interest rates in both a short and long temporal horizon. Sections 2 and 3 provide a 
brief summary of the theoretical and empirical literature on the subject, whereas Section 4 
describes the data and method used for our estimations. In particular, we consider for the United 
States monthly data provided by the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) for the 1954-
2018 period and introduce two main innovations: (i) we use Structural Vector Autoregressive 
(SVAR) models to test the relationship between the Effective Federal Funds Rate (FF), the 
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield (AAA), and the 10-Year Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate (GB10y); and (ii), we compare the potential different effect caused by monetary 
policy on private (AAA) and public bonds (GB10y). Our main findings are described in 
Sections 5 and 6. Here the results show that monetary policy is able to permanently affect long-
term interest rates over a long-time horizon, i.e., not only in the short run but also in the long 
run. Moreover, despite the fact that the Federal Fund rate (FF) is also affected by a long-term 
interest rate shock (𝐺𝐵10𝑌), the estimated Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) 
points out that 𝐹𝐹 is mainly determined by its own shock allowing us to assume that the central 
bank has a certain degree of freedom in setting the level of short-term interest rates. This may 
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be relevant in light of the recent ‘secular stagnation theory’ according to which the 
natural/neutral long-term rate of interest would be stemmed from real factors, namely the 
interaction between the supply of saving and demand for investment. In line with the Keynesian 
tradition, our findings show that monetary policy is able to produce permanent and significant 
effects on long-term interest rates by thus showing that interest rates should be conceived as 
monetary-determined variables rather than real ones. 
 
2. The theory of interest rates structure 
In a neoclassical perspective, capital arbitrage will adapt the real rate of interest to the expected 
capital profitability determined by “productivity and thrift”, at least in the long run (cf. 
Wicksell, 1898 and 1901; Hayek, 1930; Robertson, 1940). In some cases, when the Ricardian 
equivalence is rejected, this rate is also seen to be influenced by the net borrowing of public 
sector due to its “absorption” of private savings (cf. e.g. Caporale and Williams, 2002; Correia-
Nunes and Stomitsiotis, 1999; Howe and Pigott, 1991; Ireland, 1996; Merha, 1996; Reinhart 
and Sack, 2000; Gruber and Kamin, 2012).2 
In the case of real and financial investments of different lengths, the non-arbitrage 
condition is extended to equalize the expected returns from short- and long-term investment 
strategies. The long-term interest rate is thus seen to be approximately equal to an average of 
the expected spot short-term real interest rates within the time horizon taken into consideration 
(cf. Hicks, 1946: 145. Cf. also Fisher, 1930; Lutz, 1940). These in turn will be shaped by the 
long run expectations on the perceived levels of the “neutral” interest rate, namely the rate that 
is consistent with the long run growth rate (cf. Estrella and Mishkin, 1996; Bauer and 
Rudebusch, 2016).3 The result is a long run real yield curve which will be flat in a stationary 
economy but may have a different shape if changes over time in the determinants of the natural 
rate of interest – namely, in households’ preferences, endowments and technical knowledge – 
are expected.4 The same applies to the long-run structure of nominal interest rates which is 
                                                 
2 It is also argued that a country-specific default risk depending on the level of its public debt-income  ratio will 
exist. However, the case of Japan shows us that other factors - among which, the central bank’s behaviour - are 
relevant in determining whether Government bonds are viewed as risky by the market. Moreover, the cases of 
Germany and the United States during the recent economic crises underline that portfolio effects may lead to a 
higher demand for public bonds and therefore to lower interest rates even if an increase in public debt occurs - 
and even when, as in the case of the United States, its initial ratio relative to the gross domestic product is already 
high compared with other countries.   
3Typically, the natural or neutral interest rate is the one corresponding to potential output. See Levrero (2019). 
4 In the first case, the series of interest rates would be stationary, whereas in the second case, they oscillate around 
a moving average.  
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obtained by adding – as an element that shapes the yield curve – the long-run expected rate of 
inflation according to the Fisher effect (cf. Fisher,1930). 
However, unless a condition of perfect foresight and confidence is assumed (cf. Conard, 
1966), even in a neoclassical perspective, the shape of the long-run yield curve is conceived as 
being influenced by the investors’ perception of risk and the liquidity preference, namely the 
preference of borrowers for long-term loans and of lenders for short-term loans (cf. Hicks, 
1946: 146-147).5 Hence the interest rates structure is modified by adding a term premium to 
the one stemming from the expectation theory which increases with the lengthening of bond 
maturities (cf. Campbell et al., 1997; Shiller, 1990). Even if the expected short rates are 
unchanged, the long-term interest rate should in fact be higher than the rate on shorter term 
investments to induce investors to subscribe a forward contract. Therefore - in the presence of 
liquidity and risk premiums - the forward short-term interest rate will exceed the expected 
short-term interest rate to the extent of these premiums.6 Only when the short spot interest rates 
are expected to fall, “the forward rates can lie below the current rate” and therefore the long-
term interest rates can be lower than the current short-term rates (Hicks, 1946: 147).7 A similar 
conclusion is achieved by the theory of preferred habits (cf. Modigliani and Sutch, 1966; 
Modigliani and Shiller, 1973) according to which the term premium will be higher the higher 
market segmentation is and therefore the lower the degree of substitutability between assets of 
different length and kind.8 The nominal term structure would in fact be determined in this case 
by: (i) the expected future short term interest rates, (ii) the expectations on future changes in 
the price level, and (iii) risk premiums9 which are not wiped out by the arbitrage activity due 
                                                 
5 As observed by Hicks (1946: 146-47), “if no extra return is offered for long lending most people (and institutions) 
would prefer to lend short, at least in the sense that they would prefer to hold their money in deposit in some way 
or other”. Of course, this preference for liquidity applies even in the case of a unique bond due to the perspective 
of a change in its price. Yet, it will be higher for bonds of longer maturity also because an increase in the interest 
rate would lead to a greater fall in their value (cf. Campbell. 1995). More generally, the lenders will face a lower 
risk by shortening the loan period. 
6 We refer here to the interest rate of the monetary standard. The own rate of interest of each commodity may 
differ from it when the relative prices of the commodities change over time, namely it will be equal to the rate of 
the standard minus the “contango” (that is, the percentage change of the forward price of the commodity relative 
to its spot price). As outlined by Hicks, the “monetary” rate may also be “complex” due to a liquidity premium 
and default risk of the borrower. 
7 According to Taylor (1992), it explains the higher volatility of long-term interest rates compared with the 
expectation theory. As stressed by Shiller (1979) and Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1991), this means that the 
forward rates cannot be predictors of future spot rates (cf. also below, note 9).  
8 This degree of substitution is higher between assets with closer maturities. 
9 Nevertheless, the difference in the yield of a n-period security from that provided by the expectation theory can 
be positive or negative. It will depend on what is needed to bring agents with different preferred habits into the 
market of a specific bond when an unbalance occurs between the funds supplied by the lenders and those 
demanded by the borrowers. Risk premiums could be negative if a preference for income certainty (as in the case 
of institutional investors) prevails, or when there is a preference for risk. Risk premiums, however, are usually 
assumed as increasing along the yield curve (cf. Conard, 1966; Kessel, 1995).  
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to operating costs, reluctance to go beyond some over-all commitment on specific assets and 
so on. 
In short – irrespective of the way in which expectations on short-term interest rates and 
inflation are formed – the relation will hold that 
 
(1 + 𝑅𝑛)
𝑛 = (1 + 𝑟1)(1 + 𝑟2) … . (1 + 𝑟𝑛) + 𝜎𝑛  (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑛 is the real rate of interest of a n-period asset, 𝑟𝑡 are the expected spot short interest 
rates for time 𝑡 =  1, … , 𝑛, and 𝜎𝑛 is the term premium associated to a n-period asset. The 
corresponding nominal interest rate will be approximately equal to 𝑅𝑛 plus the expected 
average inflation rate in the time horizon taken into consideration when considering that 
(1 + 𝑟𝑡)(1 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑎) = (1 + 𝑖𝑡) where it is the nominal interest rate for time t. 
In this framework, an influence of monetary policy on the interest rate term structure is 
admitted only in the short run. The short run yield curve may differ from the one which will 
prevail in the long run due to changes in the risk premiums (𝜎𝑛 in equation 1) during the cycle 
(cf. Orphanides and Wei, 2010), errors in expectations, the interventions of the central bank in 
the credit and bond markets setting the interest rate at a level which differs from the natural 
one, and the expectations regarding the future stance of monetary policy and business cycle 
conditions. It is a difference that may be fuelled by extrapolative or adaptive expectations on 
future short-term interest rates and price inflation as in Meiselman (1962) and Modigliani and 
Sucth (1973),10 as well as by some inelasticity of the expected interest rates as needed by the 
theory of liquidity preference. Moreover, it is influenced by the coherence of monetary policy 
(Haldane, 1999) because the expectations on future short rates take into account the reaction 
function and policy rules of central banks, as well as their credibility. For instance, the yield 
curve will be different according to the credibility of the action of monetary authorities against 
inflation and therefore the likelihood ascribed to a further tightening or future easing of 
monetary policy. 
This view – that is shared by the modern theory of central banking (cf. Woodford, 2003) 
according to which monetary authorities set the short-term interest rates and may have an 
                                                 
10 Fisher, on the other hand, ascribed the possibility of discrepancy between the market and natural interest rate 
precisely to adaptive price expectations. However, the nominal interest rates do not necessarily increase when the 
expected inflation rate increases irrespective of the way in which expectations are formed (cf. Tobin, 1965), nor 
do they necessarily change in response to actual inflation unless as the result of the central bank’s reaction to a 
higher inflation rate. Cf. in this regard, Tymoigne (2006), who also analyses Keynes’s criticism of the Fisher 
effect due to the absence of perfect foresight. Cf. also on empirical grounds, Caporale and Williams (2002) and 
Lavoie and Seccareccia (2004: 175). 
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influence on the short-run yield curve11– has similarities with Keynes’s approach and is also 
advanced by post-Keynesian economists (cf. e.g., Wray, 2003: 212). For Keynes, in fact, the 
monetary authorities can easily control the short-term interest rates and have an influence on 
the long-term interest rates (cf. Keynes, 1930: 353)12 unless the current short-term interest rate 
“has fallen to a level which, on the basis of past experience and present expectations of future 
monetary policy, is considered ‘unsafe’ by representative opinion” (Keynes, 1936: 202-3; 
Keynes’ emphasis). Moreover, Keynes also points out that only a coherent monetary policy 
can affect the interest rate structure. In fact: 
“a monetary policy which strikes public opinion as being experimental in character or easily 
liable to change may fail in its objective of greatly reducing the long-term rate of interest […].” 
(Keynes, 1936, Ch. 15, 203). 
 
Finally, not only Keynes emphasizes that the interest rates on loans of different length are 
influenced by risk premiums due to moral hazard, an insufficient yield security, “the risk and 
trouble” to make a productive investment. He also stresses that during a cyclical boom the risks 
accounted by lenders and borrowers become “imprudently low” (Keynes, 1936: 145) and that 
– in a market economy – there is an inherent tendency to speculative bubbles fuelled by 
expectations of capital gains. Incidentally, this would give us an explanation of the volatility 
of the long-term interest rates (cf. McCulloch and Shiller, 1987; and Engle at al., 1987)13 which 
would differ from that in terms of time varying risk premiums as determined in the capital asset 
price model of Lucas (1978).14 
However, the Keynesian approach to the interest rate term structure differs from that which 
prevails nowadays when following a neoclassical perspective mainly for three reasons. First, 
it emphasizes that in a capitalist economy there are institutional and social limits to the arbitrage 
activity between the present and the future. Second, a limited impact on the nominal interest 
rates is ascribed to the Fisher effect. According to Keynes, if a higher inflation rate is not 
forecast, it cannot affect the current decisions of lenders and borrowers, and when prices rise 
it will be too late for money holders to put inflation up by means of a change in the nominal 
interest rate. Moreover, even when price inflation is forecast, the arbitrage activity would 
                                                 
11 On central banks setting the interest rate, cf. Bindseil (2004) and Fullwiler (2008). 
12 Keynes, in this respect, refers to Reifer (1930). Cf. Keynes (1930: 359-362; and 1936: 152-53). 
13 According to Kessel, it would also stem from the fact that the short-term bonds are closer substitutes of money 
and so, when the interest rate rises, the opportunity cost to hold short term bonds compared with long term bonds 
also increases, which means a higher liquidity premium for the latter. 
14In Lucas (1978), the long term real interest rates are estimated indirectly by means of a constrained intertemporal 
utility maximization in a world of uncertainty on nominal prices and incomes. Cf. also Hirshleifer (1970). 
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mainly regard money and real goods15 and there might be a limited incentive to arbitrage 
because an increase in the nominal interest rate would lead to a fall in the value of assets and 
be to some extent counterproductive (Kahn, 1954).16 
More importantly, for Keynes the long run interest rate does not stem from any underlying 
long-term market forces preventing central banks from controlling the long-run rate of interest. 
For Keynes, central banks operate on short-term interest rates only due to institutional settings 
that lead them in practice “to concentrate upon short-term debts and to leave the price of long-
term debts to be influenced by belated and imperfect reactions from the price of short-term 
debts.”17Yet, Keynes maintains, “there is no need to do so” (cf. Keynes, 1936: 206), namely 
market operations should not be limited to the purchase of very short-dated securities. 
Moreover, he stresses that open market operations can “change expectations concerning the 
future policy of the central bank or of the government” (cf. Keynes, 1936: 197) affecting, in 
this way, the interest rates term structure in the short as well as the long run. Thus, according 
to Keynes, the long-run interest rate may for decades be at a level that is “chronically too high 
for full employment” and it is “a highly conventional” phenomenon because 
 
“its actual value is largely governed by the prevailing view as to what its value is 
expected to be. Any level of interest which is accepted with sufficient conviction as 
likely to be durable will be durable; subject, of course, in a changing society to 
fluctuations for all kinds of reasons around the expected normal” (Keynes, 1936: 203).18 
 
This idea that central banks may control the long-run interest rates by shaping the short- 
run rates and their expected levels is also shared by the more recent post-Keynesian literature 
(see among others, Moore, 1988; Wray, 1992; Godley, 1999), according to which portfolio 
choices – by changing the desired proportions of different assets19– will adapt the prices of 
                                                 
15In fact bonds, like money, do not usually protect the lenders from inflation. 
16The idea of Cottrell (1994) that an increase in the nominal rate would nevertheless occur due to an increase in 
the level of income stemming from a higher marginal efficiency of capital that would be the consequence of a 
higher expected inflation rate does not consider that money is endogenous and the scant reactivity of investment 
to the interest rate. 
17 A recent example of this institutional setting is provided by the following quotation: “Before the global financial 
crisis, the Federal Reserve used OMOs to adjust the supply of reserve balances so as to keep the federal funds rate 
- the interest rate at which depository institutions lend reserve balances to other depository institutions overnight 
- around the target established by the FOMC.” https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm.  
18 For a case of a long-term interest rate that is set on average at a level that is higher than the “neutral” rate, 
Keynes refers to the experience before the First World War when the Bank of England kept the interest rates at a 
level that was too high for full employment in order to favour the financial interests of the City of London. Another 
example of a conventional and stable long-term interest rate controlled by the central bank is, for Keynes, after 
the abandoning of the gold standard (cf. Keynes, 1936: 204). 
19 This differs from Tobin (1969) where asset supplies are given and market arbitrage determines the structure of 
interest rates. 
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long-term bonds to those of short-term bonds influenced by the central bank. However, it does 
not mean that central banks do not encounter obstacles to their actions aimed at controlling the 
long-term interest rates, especially in the short run (cf. Pollin, 1996). These obstacles may arise 
from liquidity preference becoming virtually absolute, abnormal circumstances, a currency 
crisis, changes in the risk premiums and profit margins of the bank system. Nor does it means 
that monetary policy rate is set in a vacuum independent of distributive and external 
constraints, especially in the case of a small country facing free cross-border capital flows.20 It 
means, however, that central banks – especially for a country with a leading role in the financial 
markets – may have the instruments to face expectations of capital losses and the power to set 
– on average – the long term interest rate at a desired level (cf. also Lavoie and Seccareccia, 
2004). Besides changing the policy rate, monetary authorities can achieve their objectives by 
operating in specific market segments in order to influence the spread between short-and long-
term interest rates, intervening in the exchange foreign markets and varying the collaterals 
admitted to financing the bank system (cf. Levrero, 2019). The experiences of the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank in the last decade provide several insights in this 
respect. 
Unlike what is stated in any model centred on a tendency of the market interest rate to a 
natural rate, Keynes’s statement that central banks may set on average the long-term interest 
rate also means that their action can affect long-run capital profitability. According to Keynes, 
this would pass through a change in the amount of investments insofar as the marginal 
efficiency of capital differs from the monetary interest rate.21A more direct cost-adjustment 
mechanism has been advanced, however. Taking the money wages, the normal profits of 
enterprise and the methods of production as given, under the pressure of competition the price 
level will vary in the same direction as the long-term interest rate on riskless bonds22 because 
this rate enters into the normal costs of production of the commodities since it is the opportunity 
                                                 
20 For an analysis of the influence of the expected exchange rates on the interest rates cf. Lavoie (2000) who 
criticize the power purchasing parity theorem and also a necessary tendency to a real interest parity less than a 
risk premium determined by the amount of foreign indebtedness. According to Lavoie (2000), the forward 
exchange rate is institutionally set at a value equal to the current exchange rate plus the difference between the 
domestic interest rate and the rate prevailing at the international level. Central banks may manipulate the 
difference between spot and forward exchange rates with interventions in these markets. 
21 The money interest rate is according to Keynes the greatest own interest rate that the marginal efficiency of 
capital assets must attain if they are to be newly produced. It has, according to Keynes, the greatest liquidity 
premium, zero carrying costs, zero nominal appreciation or depreciation and zero productive return. More 
generally, according to Keynes, it is the asset whose own interest rate falls more slowly that eventually knocks 
out the profitable production of each of the other assets unless an appreciation of prices occurs.  
22 Note that this adjustment through the “cost channel” also helps to explain the scant reactivity of investments to 
the rate of interest because its changes would determine a change in the same direction as capital profitability. 
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cost of capital irrespective of the form of firm financing. Therefore, its change will lead to a 
change in the ratio of prices relative to money wages and thus in capital profitability (cf. Pivetti, 
1991). 
While this idea of a “monetary theory of distribution” differs from that of a natural rate of 
interest set by “productivity and thrift” as in Wicksell, it also differs from any approach in 
which the rate of profits depends on real factors. For instance, in Marx, the rate of profit is 
determined by the real wage rate and the technical conditions of production whereas in post-
Keynesian models, the rate of profits is determined by the rate of capital accumulation 
according to the Cambridge equation (cf. Kaldor, 1956).23Only in this latter case, however, the 
long-run interest rate will be determined on average by the rate of profits (cf. Nell, 1999).24 In 
Marx, the rate of profit would only shape the upper limit of the rate of interest – at least from 
a certain point of capitalist development when usury capital lost relevance – and the division 
of the profit rate between the interest rate and the normal profit of enterprise would depend on 
the power relations between financial and industrial capital which can change in the course of 
capitalist development. (cf. Panico, 1987) 
 
3. The estimates on the relationships between short- and long-term interest 
rates 
 
In order to discuss the relationship between interest rates on assets with different lengths and 
risks, we can focus on four rates, namely the nominal policy interest rate 𝑖𝑐, the nominal interest 
rate on a short-term public bond 𝑖𝑠𝑔, the rate  𝑖𝑙𝑔 on a long-term public bond which is riskless 
but has a lower degree of liquidity compared with assets of shorter length, and finally the 
nominal rate of interest on long-term private bonds 𝑖𝑙𝑓 that also includes a risk premium which 
is related to productive investment25 but is lower than that embodied in the yields of the stock 
market. Due to the arbitrage activity of households and firms, the other rates should move in 
                                                 
23As known, assuming for the sake of simplicity that workers’ propensity to save is zero, the equality between 
savings  per unit of capital 𝑠𝑐r (where 𝑠𝑐  is the propensity to save of capitalist, and r the rate of profits) and the 
rate of accumulation 
𝐼
𝐾
 , namely 
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝑠𝑐r, would imply that r is determined by the rate of capital accumulation. For 
a criticism of this theory of distribution, cf. Garegnani (1992).  
24 Asset returns in the stock market are related to firm profits and if the profit rate rises, asset owners will buy 
stocks and sell financial assets (bonds), that is, capital arbitrage will decrease the price of bonds and increase the 
rate of interest on long-term bonds. 
25 It can be affected by some measure of credit worthiness for business enterprises. 
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the same direction unless changes in expectations and risk premiums occur that affect the shape 
of the nominal yield curve.26 We have  
𝑖𝑐 = 𝑖 ̿   (2) 
𝑖𝑠𝑔 = 𝑖𝑐 + 𝑡𝑠𝑔  (3) 
𝑖𝑙𝑔 = 𝑖𝑠𝑔 + 𝑡𝑙𝑔  (4) 
𝑖𝑙𝑓 = 𝑖𝑙𝑔 + 𝜎𝑓  (5) 
 
where usually 𝑖𝑐 < 𝑖𝑠𝑔 < 𝑖𝑙𝑔 < 𝑖𝑙𝑓; 𝑡𝑠𝑔 is the term premium for the short-term bond which is 
affected by expectations on future monetary policies and by a liquidity premium, as well as, if 
relevant, by the expectations on future price inflation; 𝑡𝑙𝑔 is the additional term premium that 
stems from the same factors mentioned above when considering the additional length of time 
taken into consideration for long-term government bonds; 𝜎𝑓 is the risk premium for a private 
long-term bond compared to the interest rate on long-term public bonds. 
With these premises, the issues to be analysed are if and to what extent monetary 
authorities affect the structure of interest rates through their policy instruments, and whether 
the causal relation between short- and long-term interest rates is one-directional and differs in 
short and long temporal horizons. 
Looking at the experience of the United States, a change in the short-term interest rate is 
usually deemed to affect the long-run rates but with a different intensity (cf. Estrella and 
Mishkin, 1997; Cock and Hahn, 1989). As a broad rule, for Poole (2005) and Rudebusch et al. 
(2006), in the period 1984-2005, a 1% point increase in the Federal Funds rate FF would lead 
to an increase of about 30 basis points in the 10-year bond rate. According to Atesoglu (2005), 
typically the FF and the bond rates move together (see also Akran and Li, 2016),27 but there is 
less than complete pass-through from the former to the long-run interest rates (specifically, on 
10-year and 30-year Treasury bonds, and on AAA bonds). Moreover, the effect is in the short 
run lower than in the long run when the cointegration coefficient is approximately equal to 0.6. 
Finally, Akhtar (1995) estimates that the effect on the long-term interest rate of a percentage 
change of 1 per cent in the short interest rate oscillates between 22 and 60 basis-points. 
                                                 
26 For instance, the bank deposit rate is affected by the interest rate on short-term public bonds because they are 
close substitutes for households, whereas the rate of interest on short-run bank loans is influenced by the overnight 
interest rate set in the interbank market as well as by the rate on short-term bonds that the banks can buy. Similarly, 
the rate on long-run bank loans and on long-run bonds issued by private firms are affected by the long-run interest 
rates on riskless assets and in turn affect the yields in the stock market (cf. Godley, 1999). 
27Akran and Li (2016) also argue that the short-term rate falls after a depression and rises before a recession so 
that a negatively sloped yield curve would reveal an onset recession in the United States. 
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Other contributions, however, reject a clear response and co-movement of the long-term 
interest rates after a change in the policy rate. For the sub-periods 1983-1990, 1991-2000 and 
2001-2007, Thornton (2012) calculates a decreasing response to a change in FF, with even a 
slight negative correlation in the last period when considering private AAA bonds.28 Akhtar 
(1995) and Mehra (1996) point out that the effect would hold only in the short run because in 
the long run the monetary policy is neutral and the real interest rate is determined by the rate 
of return on capital (cf. also Cagan, 1972). Therefore, if in the long run the nominal bond rates 
move together with the policy rate, it is only because the long-term interest rates adjust to the 
expected inflation rate and at the same time, the Federal Reserve adjusts the policy rate to the 
inflation rate.29 Moreover, if in the short run a tighter monetary policy can lead to higher 
interest rates, afterwards, lower short and long-term nominal interest rates may occur due to 
lower expected inflation rates.  
It is also stated that, in the short run, the relation would be unstable and fail to support the 
expectation hypothesis (cf. Grishchenko et al., 2015; McCallum, 2005) due to variable term 
premiums which are not under the control of the monetary authorities – especially in recent 
decades after deregulation of the financial markets (cf. Comert, 2012; Pollin, 2006).30 Two 
examples are usually put forward in this respect. The first refers to the years 1994-1995 when 
a slight increase in the short-term interest rates was accompanied initially by a strong increase 
in the long-term interest rates and afterwards by a decline of the latter. The second example 
refers to Greenspan’s conundrum after the fall in the FF rate from 6.7 to 1 per cent in the years 
2000-2004, namely the fact that its subsequent rise in the years 2004-2006 to 5.4 per cent was 
accompanied by a slight fall in the interest rate on 10-year government bonds and on corporate 
BAA bonds. 
                                                 
28 Similarly, Comert (2012) points out that between 2000 and 2010, a “decoupling” between short- and long-term 
interest rates occurs. A scant effect on the long-term interest rates of a change in the short-term rates is advanced 
on the other hand by Roley and Sellon (1995) who ascribe it to the influence of expectations on future short-term 
interest rates. Cf. also Cock and Hahn (1989) and Radecki and Reinhart (1994) according to whom the long-term 
interest rates would only rise by 4 to 10 basis points in response to an increase of 100 basis points in the policy 
rate.  
29For Mehra (1996) “there is no other source of long run interaction between the bond rate and the funds rate” 
because the expected long real rate is mean stationary and in the long run is unrelated to the level of the federal 
funds rate. Therefore, the monetary policy would lower the bond rate only by lowering the trend rate of inflation. 
On the contrary, in the short run, the rise in FF may increase the expected real short rate while lowering at the 
same time the expected inflation rate. 
30 According to Pollin (2008) in the period 1973-2008, the mean spread between short- and long-term interest 
rates could not be used to forecast the latter due to a high standard deviation. Therefore, while expectations on 
monetary policy would be an element shaping the long-term interest rates as suggested by Moore (1988: 206), 
other factors such as liquidity preference, preferred habits and uncertainty should be taken into consideration. It 
is worth noting, however, that for 30 years mortgages and BAA bonds, Pollin shows a spread with respect to FF 
equal to 2.69 and 3.03 respectively, and that in these cases, the standard deviation is only 0.6% larger than the 
mean.  
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The first case has usually been interpreted as the result of shifts in the yield curve due 
initially to an expectation of incipient inflation and thus of further increases in the short interest 
rates (cf. Campbell, 1995; Rudebusch et al., 2006).31A variety of explanations has been 
advanced, however, for the years 2004-2005. Reference has been made to the effect of foreign 
intervention of Bank of Japan in the bond markets after the Asian crisis of the end of the 1990s 
(Bernanke et al., 2004; Caballero, 2006; Warnock and Warnock, 2005)32 and to the expectation 
of a slow departure from the previous expansionary stance of monetary policy (Poole, 2005) 
and thus of interest rates remaining below the natural interest rate (cf. Gruber and Kamin, 2012; 
Idier, Jardet and Loubens, 2007; Rudebusch, Swanson and Wu, 2006). Mostly, Greenspan’s 
conundrum has been explained by a saving glut due to global imbalances (Bernanke, 2005; 
2011) and by lower risk premiums associated to regulatory changes on asset/liability 
management, to a shift in private portfolio preferences towards sovereign bonds, and to a lower 
macroeconomic volatility and lower uncertainty over monetary policy (Rudebusch et al., 
2006). 
The power of central banks to control over time the structure of interest rates by affecting 
market expectations emerged again, however, during the years following the recent crisis of 
2007-2008 (cf. Gagnon et al., 2011; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012). Nevertheless, 
econometric analyses based on Granger causality33 do not show clear-cut results regarding the 
causal direction between short- and long-term interest rates in both a short and long temporal 
horizon. Lavoie and Seccareccia (2004) found a one-way Granger causality from corporate 
bond rates to the yields of stock market for quarterly data, but a two-way Granger causality in 
the case of annual data. Pollin (2008) excluded any clear one-way line of causation running 
from 𝐹𝐹 to the market rates for the years 1973-2008, while Atesoglu (2005), using a VECM 
analysis, found a unidirectional causality in the years 1987-2002 that runs from the federal 
funds rate to the AAA corporate bond yield. However, using the same method, Tymoigne 
(2006) showed for the years 1914-2004 long-term bidirectional causality between these rates 
and short-term causality going from the market rates to FF.34 
                                                 
31 Following Furher (1995), a change in the parameters of the reaction function of the central bank has also been 
considered. 
32 The influence of international capital movements has also led to the argument that there is a global yield curve 
and that within each country the correlation is stronger for rates of close maturities than for rates of distant 
maturities (cf. Moon and Perion, 2007; Diebold et al, 2008). 
33The long-term interest rates are said to be Granger-caused by the Federal Funds rate if the latter helps in the 
prediction of the current values of long-term rates – that is, if the coefficients on the lagged values of the Federal 
Funds rate are statistically significant in explaining the current long-term interest rates. 
34 Causality would hold only from the expected Federal Funds rates to the market rates, but with weak intensity. 
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Finally, Rahimi, Chu and Lavoie (2016; 2017) found time-varying linear and non-linear 
Granger causality relationships between 𝐹𝐹 and the 10-year government bond. According to 
them, as the linear causality effect from 𝐹𝐹 to the 10-year bond rate increases with the passing 
of time, there is a significant bidirectional Granger causality relationship during all time periods 
when the linear and non-linear causality tests results are combined, with the impact of the long-
term interest rate on 𝐹𝐹 appearing to be more systematic. Whereas this last conclusion would 
provide support to Pollin’s (2008) claims regarding bidirectional Granger causality, they show, 
in disagreement with Pollin, however, that there is significant linear Granger causality from 
𝐹𝐹 to the 10-year bond rate during many of the recent time periods, ascribing the result to the 
Federal Reserve targeted interest rate which was publicly announced in 1994. 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
In order to assess if the monetary authorities have the power to affect the interest rate term 
structure, in the rest of the paper, SVAR models will be implemented to test the causal 
relationship between short- and long-term interest rates, allowing us to go beyond the current 
state of the art (Atesoglu, 2005; Rahimi et al., 2016; 2017). To the best of our knowledge, at 
least within the long-lasting Keynesian tradition, this is the first attempt to use these models to 
analyse interest rate determination. 
 
3.1. Data 
Our empirical analysis uses aggregate monthly data for the US provided by the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED). In particular, we use the Money, Banking and Finance dataset which 
provides data on interest rates. All of the considered variables are summarized in Appendix 1 
and a full description of data is provided below. To estimate the existing relationship between 
short- and long-term interest rates, Effective Federal Funds Rate (𝐹𝐹), Moody's Seasoned Aaa 
Corporate Bond Yield (𝐴𝐴𝐴) and 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (𝐺𝐵10𝑌) are 
employed. 𝐹𝐹 is a short-term rate at which commercial banks lend reserves and liquidity to 
other depository institutions overnight.35 𝐴𝐴𝐴 is a long-term interest rate, usually with 
maturities of 20 years and above, on corporate bond rated 𝐴𝐴𝐴 by Moody.  𝐺𝐵10𝑌 is a long-
                                                 
35 Yet, despite the fact that we consider 𝐹𝐹 as the short-term rate set by the central bank, FED controls 𝐹𝐹 by 
means of monetary policy and changes of the discount rate (𝐷𝑅). 𝐷𝑅 is a short-term rate which the Federal 
Reserve (FED) charged to commercial banks on loans they obtained from the FED. Specifically, this is the interest 
rate charged on the primary credit discount window programme, namely the short-term rate applied to loans 
granted to sound depository institution. 
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term interest rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years. The considered time series 
start from July1954 and end in June 2018 and the selected period depends on data availability. 
Variables are not transformed into a logarithmic form since they could be zero and assume 
negative values. Since 𝐹𝐹, 𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 are not seasonally adjusted, an ARIMA X-11 
procedure is carried out to remove seasonality. The path of considered variables is represented 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
3.2. Models 
We will detect the relationship between short-and long-term interest rates by estimating two 
different models: 
 
Model 1: 𝐹𝐹 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴 
Model 2: 𝐹𝐹 − 𝐺𝐵10𝑌. 
 
In both models, we estimate the causal relationship between the short-term interest 
rate 𝐹𝐹 and the selected long-term interest rates 𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌. In particular, we are 
interested in understanding whether the central bank is able to generate a permanent effect on 
the long-term interest rate over a long temporal horizon as well as whether long-term rates are 
able to affect the short-term interest rate. As a robustness check, both Models 1 and 2 will be 
estimated on different subsamples which are calculated by dropping a selected period of time 
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from the starting sample, namely 1954:07–2018:06. More specifically, the subsamples range 
from: (i) 1954:07 to 2008:08; (ii) 1971:08 to 2018:06; (iii) 1954:07 to 1971:07 and from 
1982:10 to 2018:06; (iv) 1954:07 to 1982:11 and from 1993:07 to 2018:06; (v) 1954:07 to 
1993:08 and from 2008:09 to 2018:06. The identification of selected structural breakpoints 
depends on a periodization which is based both on alternative US monetary policy regimes and 
main historical economic facts. In particular, we consider August 1971, October 1979, 
November 1982, July 1993 and September 2008 as the main relevant turning points in US 
economic history. To be precise, in August 1971, Nixon declared the end of the Bretton Woods 
System, namely the end of dollar convertibility to gold; in October 1979, Paul Volcker 
announced a tight control over money supply which was gradually slackened in November 
1982 and permanently ended in July 1993 (Mishkin, 2001); in September 2008, after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Fed launched an unconventional monetary policy (i.e. 
quantitative easing programme) to support financial market conditions and limit the economic 
slowdown (Engen et al., 2015) by rapidly expanding its balance sheet (Hetzel, 2009; Blinder, 
2010). 
 
3.2. Methods 
First, in order to arrange the data accurately, a standard unit root test is conducted to understand 
the order of integration of selected variables. For this purpose, the Phillips-Perron test is 
performed both at levels and first differences of 𝐹𝐹, 𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌. Results are reported in 
Appendix 2 and show that variables are not stationary at levels but become stationary at first 
differences. Second, we conduct the optimal lag length of the VAR by minimizing the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). In Model 1, the optimal lag is 25 and in Model 2, it is 23. AIC 
results are reported in Appendix 3. 
However, despite the fact that considered variables are I(1) or non-stationary, a reduced-
form VAR in levels estimated as a cointegration relationship between considered variables may 
exist. In this case, the results for the estimator of a VAR in levels imply analogous results of 
the corresponding vector error correction model (VECM), since the latter model can be 
reparametrized as a reduced-form VAR model in levels (Lütkepohl, 2005; Kilian & Lütkepohl, 
2017). A reduced-form VAR(p) is represented as shown in equation (6): 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡 (6) 
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where yt is the kx1 vector of considered variables, c is the constant term, Ai is the kxk matrix 
of reduced-form coefficients and ut is a kx1 vector consisting of the error terms. In order to 
assess the causal relationship between selected interest rates, exogenous variations in these 
variables have to be identified. To do this, an identification strategy has to be imposed at 
equation (6) to obtain a structural model, namely a Structural VAR (SVAR). A SVAR(p) can 
be represented as follows in equation (7): 
 
𝐵0𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝐵𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑤𝑡 (7) 
where B0 represents the matrix of contemporaneous relationships between the k variables in 
yt, Bi is the kxk matrix of autoregressive slope coefficients, and wt is the vector of structural 
shocks. The covariance matrix of structural errors is normalized: 𝔼(wtwt
′) = ∑ =w IK. The 
estimation of the B0 (or equivalently B0
−1) matrix is implemented using the Maximum 
Likelihood method. This requires the imposition and identification of restrictions on the 
contemporaneous relationship between variables, which are typically derived from economic 
theory.36In this case, we impose a recursively identified model through a Cholesky 
decomposition where 𝐹𝐹 is ordered as first variable. The identification schemes used for 
Models 1 and 2 are summarized in the system in equation (8) and (9): 
 
𝐵0𝑦𝑡 = [
− 0
− −
] [
𝐹𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡
]      (8) 
𝐵0𝑦𝑡 = [
− 0
− −
] [
𝐹𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝐵10𝑌𝑡
] (9) 
where ‘−’ indicates an unrestricted parameter and a “0” represents a zero restriction. By means 
of the identification strategies in the system of equations (8) and (9), we assume in the first 
equation of both models a completely exogenous 𝐹𝐹. More specifically, within the monthly 
observation, the central bank can directly control 𝐹𝐹, regardless of the level of the long-term 
interest rates. Conversely, by assuming unrestricted parameters in the second equation of (8) 
and (9), the short-run interest rate (𝐹𝐹) can affect the level of long-run interest rates (𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 
𝐺𝐵10𝑌). Such an identification strategy is consistent with a Quarterly Bulletin published by 
                                                 
36 The validity of SVAR models rests on the credibility of the identification strategy imposed on the matrix B0 
(Kilian and Lütkepohl 2017). 
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the Bank of England according to which the central bank is able to affect a range of interest 
rates in the economy by controlling the short-term interest rate (McLeay et al., 2014). 
Identification makes it possible to generate a structural model and detect and quantify the 
causal relationships between the variables of interest by estimating both an impulse response 
function (IRF) and the forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) (Kilian and Lütkepohl, 
2017). Thus, once restrictions are imposed and the SVAR is estimated, an IRF is calculated 
with standard errors estimated through the asymptotic distribution. The IRF will be reported 
with a two-standard error bound, namely a 95% confidence interval.37 Estimates of FEVD will 
also be provided and it shows how much of the forecast error variance of yt+h (where h =
0, 1, … , H) is determined by each structural shock (𝑤𝑡) identified in our models (Kilian and 
Lütkepohl, 2017). This test – along with the IRF – assesses the extent to which the variability 
of variables considered in Models 1 and 2 is determined by the identified structural shocks. 
Finally, in order to assess the presence of a non-linear relationship between considered 
variables, we estimate a threshold dynamics SVAR (ThSVAR) (Balke, 2000). To do this, a 
threshold will be computed on the short-term interest rate 𝐹𝐹 by using the method of simulation 
implemented by Hansen (1996). Subsequently, a generalized IRF (GIRF) will be estimated to 
capture the feasible non-linearity relationship between short- and long-term interest rates. In 
particular, we are interested in detecting whether: (i) the different regimes (i.e., above or below 
the threshold) produce different IRFs; (ii) positive and negative changes in 𝐹𝐹  (within the 
same regime) engender a symmetrical effect on long-term rates 𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌. 
 
4. Findings  
 
In this paragraph, we report the results of IRF and FEVD estimated for Models 1 and 2 for the 
period 1954:07–2018:06 and the subsample 1954:07 to 2008:08. These findings are reported 
in Figures 2 to 4 where Shock 1 represents an exogenous change in the short-run interest rate 
(𝐹𝐹), while Shock 2 is a shock to the long-run interest rate. In Model 1, the variable which 
identifies Shock 2 is AAA whereas in Model 2, it is 𝐺𝐵10𝑌. The results regarding the 
additional subsamples are discussed in the next paragraph and IRFs are reported in Appendix 
4. 
                                                 
37 With regard to the choice of standard-errors bands, see Sims and Zha (1999) and Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017, 
p. 334) 
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As shown in Figure 2, when we consider Model 1 for the period 1954:07–2018:06 (Box 
1) and the subsample 1954:07–2008:08 (Box 2), we can affirm that a positive shock 
to 𝐹𝐹 (Shock 1) exerts a significant, positive and permanent effect on the private long-term 
interest rate 𝐴𝐴𝐴. The dynamic effect estimated through an IRF produces a significant peak 
response after twenty months and remains significant at a longer horizon of one hundred and 
twenty months (Figure 2, Box 1). The same dynamics as the IRF occur when we consider the 
sub-sample 1954:07–2008:08 (Figure 2, Box 2) with a non-significant result of the IRF after 
one hundred months. Yet, despite the fact that a positive shock to private long-term rate 
𝐴𝐴𝐴 (Shock 2 in Figure 2) engenders a weak positive effect on 𝐹𝐹 within the first six months, 
the effect of Shock 2 becomes non-significant for all the remaining considered horizon. We 
can therefore affirm that one direction of causality that moves from the short-run interest rate 
to the long-run 𝐴𝐴𝐴 rate exists. This unidirectional effect from short- to long-term interest rates 
is not confirmed when we include the 10-Year long-term interest rate on treasury bond 
(𝐺𝐵10𝑌) in Model 2. Indeed, when 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 is considered, a bidirectional effect is estimated.  
 
Figure 2. Impulse Response Function, Model 1. 
Box 1,1954:07–2018:06 Box 2, 1954:07–2008:08 
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Shock 1 and Shock 2 correspond to exogenous changes in 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴, respectively. Two-standard error bands 
corresponding to a 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 3. Impulse Response Function, Model 2. 
Box 1, 1954:07–2018:06 Box 2, 1954:07–2008:08 
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Shock 1 and Shock 2 correspond to exogenous changes in 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌, respectively. Two-standard error bands 
corresponding to a 95% confidence interval. 
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As shown in Figure 3, a positive shock to 𝐹𝐹 (Shock 1) generates a positive, permanent 
and long-lasting effect on 𝐺𝐵10𝑌. In the two selected periods of time (Figure 3, Box 1 and 
Box 2), the IRF associated to shock 1 produces a significant peak response after twenty months 
which remains significant at a longer horizon of one hundred and twenty months. In the case 
of shock 2, the IRF generates a peak effect after fourteen months which remains significant at 
a longer horizon of one hundred (Figure 3, Box 1) and seventy months (Figure 3, Box 2). 
Such results are confirmed and strengthened when forecast error variance decomposition 
(FEVD) is estimated for Models 1 and 2. Findings are reported in Figure 4, where Boxes 1 and 
2 regard FEVD estimated for Model 1 whereas Boxes 3 and 4 are the estimations of FEVD for 
Model 2.38 In the case of Model 1, 𝐹𝐹 shock (Shock 1) accounts for 95% of the FEVD of 𝐹𝐹 for 
all the considered horizon, namely one hundred and twenty months (Figure 4, Box 1). A similar 
average result of 90% for Shock 1 is estimated when a different time span is considered when 
studying the FEVD of 𝐹𝐹 (Figure 4, Box 2). In other words, the FEVD of 𝐹𝐹 is completely 
determined by its own shock. On the contrary, when in Figure 4 (Box 1) we look at the FEVD 
of 𝐴𝐴𝐴, Shock 1 accounts for 15% in the first year, 82% after one hundred and twenty months 
and 66% on average. Shock 2 accounts for 34% of the FEVD of AAA. When a different time 
span is considered in Box 2, Shock 1 continues to explain most of the FEVD of AAA. Shock 
1 accounts for 17% in the first year increasing to 73% after one hundred and twenty months. 
On average, Shock 1 accounts for 62% of the FEVD of 𝐴𝐴𝐴. In other words, Shock 1 
(𝐹𝐹 shock) explains the great extent of FEVD of the long-term interest rate 𝐴𝐴𝐴. On the 
contrary, Shock 2 (𝐴𝐴𝐴 shock) has a weak effect on the FEVD of 𝐹𝐹 rate and 𝐴𝐴𝐴. When we 
look at the FEVD estimated for Model 2 (Figure 4, Box 3 and 4), the shock to the long-run 
interest rate 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 explains the FEVD of 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 more than that estimated in the case 
of Model 1. In particular, the average estimated on one hundred and twenty months shows that 
79% of the FEVD of  𝐹𝐹 is explained by its own shock (Figure 4, Box 3). Such a result is 76% 
when a subsample is considered (Figure 4, Box 4). With regard to the FEVD of 𝐺𝐵10𝑌, a 
Shock to 𝐹𝐹(Shock 1) accounts for 15% in the first year, 59% after one hundred and twenty 
months and 50% on average. When a subsample is considered (Figure 4, Box 4), Shock 1 
explains 16% of the FEVD of 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 in the first year, 52% after one hundred and twenty 
months and 45% on average. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Tables of FEVD are available upon request. 
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Figure 4. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, Models 1 and 2. 
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The findings estimated by means of the IRF and FEVD allow us to draw three main 
conclusions. First, an asymmetry in the relationship between short- and long-run interest rates 
exists. In particular, although we found a bidirectional relationship in Model 2 when the 10-
year treasury bond 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 is included as the long-run rate, a unidirectional relationship that 
moves from short- to long-run interest rates is estimated when the interest rate on corporate 
bonds ranked 𝐴𝐴𝐴 is taken into consideration in Model 1. Second, the conclusion drawn by the 
IRF is confirmed and strengthened by the FEVD and shows that monetary policy is able to 
permanently affect long-term interest rates over a long horizon, that is to say, not only in the 
short run but also in the long run. In this way, following the Keynesian tradition, long-term 
interest rates appear to be strongly influenced and determined by the central bank. Third, 
despite that fact that in Model 2 𝐹𝐹 is affected by the long-term interest rate shock (Shock 2), 
the estimated FEVD shows that 𝐹𝐹 is mainly determined by its own shock allowing us to 
assume the central bank has a certain degree of freedom in setting the level of the short-run 
interest rate.  
 
5. Linearity, stability and robustness 
 
This section is dedicated to understanding the stability of our findings and whether a non-linear 
relationship exists between the considered variables. 
First, we reported in Appendix 4 the IRFs estimated on different time spans, namely from: 
(i) 1971:08 to 2018:06; (ii) 1954:07 to 1971:07 and from 1982:10 to 2018:06; (iii) 1954:07 to 
1982:11 and from 1993:07 to 2018:06; (iv) 1954:07 to 1993:08 and from 2008:09 to 2018:06. 
Findings presented in Appendix 4 confirm out previous estimations by allowing us to conclude 
that the results are robust to different model specifications. Specifically, in the case of Model 
1, we can confirm a unidirectional influence that moves from a short- to long-term interest 
rate 𝐴𝐴𝐴. On the contrary, in the case of Model 2, we corroborate a bidirectional relationship 
when the 10-year treasury bond is introduced in the model as a long-term interest rate. In 
particular, a positive shock to 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 produces a positive and long-lasting effect on 𝐹𝐹, 
usually significant up to eighty months after the initial shock. These results are confirmed in 
all the selected time spans reported in Appendix 4. Similarly, the effect generated by a positive 
shock to 𝐹𝐹 in Models 1 and 2 is permanent and statistically significant over all the considered 
horizon of one hundred and twenty months. These results allow us to conclude that monetary 
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policy is able to permanently affect the level of the long-term interest rates not only in the short 
but also in the long term. 
Second, to test potential non-linearity in our estimates, GIRFs through ThSVAR models 
are estimated. We are interested in understanding whether positive or negative changes in the 
short-term interest rate 𝐹𝐹 lead to a different reaction of the long-term rate 𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌. 
Following Hansen's method of simulation (1996), the threshold value has to maximize the log 
determinants of the structural residuals and it is estimated on 𝐹𝐹. In Model 1, the value of the 
threshold is about 7.18 and in Model 2, it is about 7.27. Upper regime GIRFs are estimated 
above these thresholds and in the case of values below the threshold, we calculate low regime 
GIRFs. Additionally, within each regime, we evaluate whether positive and negative shocks to 
𝐹𝐹 produce symmetrical effects on long-term interest rates 𝐴𝐴𝐴 (Figure 5, Box 1 and 3) and 
𝐺𝐵10𝑌 (Figure 5, Box 2 and 4). Findings are reported in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Generalized Impulse Response Function, ThSVAR 
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In the upper regime (Box 1 and 2 in Figure 5), estimations produce similar hump-shaped 
GIRFs for Models 1 and 2 with a peak effect that occurs by the fortieth month. The dynamics 
of the GIRFs are symmetrical both in the case of positive and negative shocks to 𝐹𝐹 thus 
showing a linear relationship between short- and long-term rates. Unlike the upper regime, in 
the low regime, the dynamics of the GIRFs are not hump-shaped (Box 3 and 4 in Figure 5). 
Indeed, the GIRFs reach a peak at a longer horizon where the response of long-term interest 
rates 𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐺𝐵10𝑌 stabilizes at a higher (or lower) level. As shown in Box 3 and 4, where 
the responses of low regime are considered, positive and negative shocks to 𝐹𝐹 determine 
symmetrical responses thus showing the existence of a linear relationship between short- and 
long-term interest rates even below the threshold. Yet, despite the presence of linearity in the 
relationship between short- and long-term interest rates within the same regime, such a linearity 
does not exist among regimes. Findings show that the peak effect reached in the upper regime 
is higher than the peak response effected in the low regime. However, the long-term effect, 
namely after one hundred months, is larger in the low regime than in the upper regime.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In order to detect the relationship between short- and long-term interest rates, the current paper 
focuses on data for the US economy for the 1954-2018 period. To do this, we implement a 
SVAR model on monthly interest rates, namely the federal funds rate, the 10-year treasury 
bond and the corporate bonds ranked AAA. We also check for robustness of the results using 
different model specifications. 
Both the linearity in the relationship between short- and long-term interest rates within 
the same regime and the larger long-term effect in the low regime than in the upper one seem 
to confirm that central banks can affect long-term interest rates by changing the short-term 
rates. The lower effect estimated for the upper regime can be probably explained by stronger 
expectations of future falls in the short-term nominal interest rates over a certain threshold. 
This result of a central bank that is able to affect long-term interest rates cannot be 
rejected on the basis of the bidirectional relationship found when the 10-year treasury bond is 
included as the long-run rate. Since a unidirectional relationship holds when the interest rate 
on corporate bonds ranked AAA is taken into consideration, the bidirectional relationship may 
simply reflect a sensitivity of central banks to public debt management. In addition, the 
estimated Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) shows, on the one hand, that most 
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of the variability of long-term interest rates is explained by the short-run interest rate controlled 
by the Fed and, on the other, that 𝐹𝐹 is mainly determined by its own shock. The latter confirms 
that the central bank has a certain degree of freedom in setting the level of short-run interest 
rates. 
Of course, this does not mean that monetary policy is set in a vacuum and that, in the 
short run, central banks may not lose control of the structure of interest rates. It only means 
that they have the power, when operating coherently, to affect this structure and, therefore, that 
there is a possibility that a monetary policy will affect income distribution. Since these results 
have been achieved considering a core country like the United States, further analyses, 
however, should be provided to assess to what extent international short- and long-term capital 
flows can limit the ability of monetary authorities to control the structure of interest rates – 
especially in small open countries. 
In summary, our findings are in line with the Keynesian tradition and allow us to 
conclude that monetary policy is able to generate permanent effects on long-term interest rates 
over a long period of time. This confirms the idea that interest rates should be conceived as 
monetary-determined variables rather than be influenced by real factors such as “productivity 
and thrift”. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
Effective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted (FF) 
 
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
(AAA) 
 
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
(GB10Y) 
 
Appendix 2. 
 
These two subparagraphs contain the results of the unit root test (Phillips-Perron). 
 
2.1. Effective Federal Funds Rate (FF), Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond (AAA), and 
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (GB10Y)  
 
2.1.1. Unit root test (Phillips-Perron):  
H0: variable at level has a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test 
Variables 
Intercept Trend & Intercept None 
Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value 
FF -2.362220 0.1530 -2.669383 0.2498 -1.355568 0.1627 
AAA -1.558726 0.5033 -1.564578 0.8061 -0.429502 0.5281 
GB10Y -1.609921 0.4770 -1.875761 0.6661 -0.614086 0.4513 
 
2.1.2. Unit root test (Phillips-Perron): 
H0: variable at first difference has a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test 
Variables 
Intercept Trend & Intercept None 
Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value 
D(FF) -18.68188 0.0000 -18.65883 0.0000 -18.69598 0.0000 
D(AAA) -19.49090 0.0000 -19.52537 0.0000 -19.50426 0.0000 
D(GB10Y) -20.62701 0.0000 -20.65691 0.0000 -20.64122 0.0000 
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Appendix 3. 
This appendix contains the results of the lag length selection based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion 
 
Akaike Information Criterion 
 Lag Model 1 Model 2 
0  8.837636  8.604051 
1  0.976063  1.433349 
2  0.704850  1.146586 
3  0.641187  1.107962 
4  0.647169  1.101968 
5  0.646653  1.093609 
6  0.651515  1.088153 
7  0.617316  1.077898 
8  0.620729  1.069951 
9  0.549445  1.001671 
10  0.544598  0.989285 
11  0.546540  0.989867 
12  0.546526  0.992237 
13  0.520501  0.960638 
14  0.500539  0.946478 
15  0.494635  0.938184 
16  0.467265  0.909867 
17  0.440806  0.887651 
18  0.447033  0.893524 
19  0.417085  0.873333 
20  0.419544  0.864878 
21  0.403991  0.861040 
22  0.408076  0.855026 
23  0.398092   0.837200* 
24  0.398785  0.843327 
25   0.395010*  0.846523 
26  0.404128  0.855253 
27  0.400868  0.844849 
28  0.395485  0.838803 
29  0.404512  0.848049 
30  0.409417  0.854265 
31  0.418802  0.860829 
32  0.424342  0.868201 
33  0.432614  0.874307 
34  0.432326  0.871321 
35  0.438127  0.877614 
36  0.441600  0.882929 
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Appendix 4. 
IRFs estimated for selected sub-samples for Models 1 and 2 are shown in the following figure. 
Impulse Response Function, selected sub-samples for Models 1 and 2 
Model 1 Model 2 
1971:08 – 2018:06 1971:08 – 2018:06 
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.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of AAA to Shock2
 
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock1
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock2
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock2
 
1954:07 1971:07 – 1982:10 2018:06 1954:07 1971:07 – 1982:10 2018:06 
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock1
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock2
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of AAA to Shock1
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of AAA to Shock2
 
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock2
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock1
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock2
 
1954:07 1982:11 – 1993:07 2018:06 1954:07 1982:11 – 1993:07 2018:06 
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock1
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock2
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of AAA to Shock1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of AAA to Shock2
 
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock1
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock2
.0
.1
.2
.3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock1
.0
.1
.2
.3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock2
 
1954:07 1993:08 – 2008:09 2018:06 1954:07 1993:08 – 2008:09 2018:06 
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock1
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock2
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of AAA to Shock1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of AAA to Shock2
 
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock1
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of FF to Shock2
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Response of GB10Y to Shock2
 
 
